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PUTTING THE S BACK IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
A MULTI-LEVEL THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
This paper provides a multi-level theoretical model to understand why business 
organizations are increasingly engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, and 
thereby exhibiting the potential to exert positive social change.  Our model integrates theories of 
micro-level organizational justice, meso-level corporate governance, and macro-level varieties of 
capitalisms.  Using a theoretical framework presented in the justice literature, we argue that 
organizations are pressured to engage in CSR by many different actors, each driven by 
instrumental, relational and moral motives.  These actors are situated within four “levels” of 
analysis: individual, organizational, national and transnational. After discussing the motives 
affecting actors at each level and the mechanisms used at each level to exercise influence, as well 
as the interactions of motives within levels, we examine forces across levels to propose the 
complex web of factors, which both facilitate and impede social change by organizations. 
Ultimately, this proposed framework can be used to systematize our understanding of the 
complex social phenomenon of increasing CSR engagement, and to develop testable hypotheses.  
We conclude by highlighting some empirical questions for future research, and discussing a 
number of managerial implications. 
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“Economic progress, through a fair and open world trading system is essential to tackle poverty 
and ensure a safer more secure world for everyone now and for future generations. The 
challenges remain of ensuring that the benefits of that progress reach all sectors in all countries 
and are not at the expense of the environment.” Sir Stephen Timms, UK Minister for CSR, 
Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, March 1, 2004.  
 
“Corporate Responsibility at Chiquita is an integral part of our global business strategy. It 
commits us to operate in a socially responsible way everywhere we do business, fairly balancing 
the needs and concerns of our various stakeholders - all those who impact, are impacted by, or 
have a legitimate interest in the Company's actions and performance.” www.chiquita.com 
 
Social change is at the core of social science inquiry.  In this paper, we develop a multi-
level theoretical model to explore why corporations around the world might trigger positive 
social change by engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives.  These initiatives 
include actions within the firm, such as changing methods of production to reduce environmental 
impacts or changing labor relationships, both within the firm and across the firm’s supply chain.  
CSR initiatives also include actions outside the firm, such as firms making infrastructure 
investments in roads, water systems, schools or hospitals in local communities in which they 
operate, or by developing philanthropic community initiatives.  While it is still contested whether 
corporations ought to be understood to have social responsibilities beyond their wealth 
generating function (Friedman, 1962; Henderson, 2001), today there exist increasing internal and 
external pressures on business organizations to fulfill broader social goals (Davies, 2003; 
Freeman et al., 2001; Logsdon & Wood, 2002).  Such a perspective is consistent with a view of 
business organizations as “polities” with interest groups, distributions of rights and duties, and 
governance systems (Zald & Berger, 1978).  We further illustrate that because business 
organizations are embedded in different national-country systems, they will experience divergent 
degrees of internal and external pressures to engage in social responsibility initiatives (Logsdon 
& Wood, 2002; Windsor, 2004).  
The definition of CSR that we are using refers to “the firm’s considerations of, and 
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response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm to 
accomplish social [and environmental] benefits along with the traditional economic gains which 
the firm seeks” (Davis, 1973: 312).1  Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) provide a 
“breakthrough” in the CSR literature with meta-analytic evidence showing a significant positive 
effect of corporate social/environmental performance on corporate financial performance, and 
Mackey, Mackey, & Barney (2005) theorize with a supply and demand model that investing in 
socially responsible initiatives will maximize the market value of the firm.  These studies bring 
some closure on the long running debate (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000, 
2001; Roman, Hayibor, & Alge, 1999; Ullmann, 1985; Wood & Jones, 1995) about whether it is 
in an organization’s best interest, at least financially, to engage in CSR.  Therefore, an important 
new line of inquiry within this field is no longer if CSR works, but rather, what catalyzes 
organizations to engage in increasingly robust CSR initiatives and consequently impart social 
change.  
Our model addresses an important gap in the existing organizational literature by 
proposing a multi-level theoretical framework of CSR which, following the advice of CSR 
scholars (Margolis & Walsh, 2001; Waddock, Bodwell, & Graves, 2002) seeks to turn our 
attention to new research questions.  We examine CSR at the micro (individual), meso 
(organizational), macro (country), and supra (transnational) level, drawing on theories from 
                                                 
1  CSR definitions have proliferated as the idea has gained traction in society and as scholars have increasingly 
studied its antecedents and consequences.  We have adopted a definition that is quite general and therefore 
“transposable” to different levels of analysis, and thus useful for our theoretical model.  The definitions cover a wide 
spectrum of views.  For example, a recent survey by The Economist on Corporate Social Responsibility (Jan 2, 
2005) synthesizes the CSR concept as “the art of doing well by doing good” although with certain skepticism.  
Henderson (2001) criticizes the notion of CSR as insufficiently defined, but still uses as a working definition: 
running business affairs, “in close conjunction with an array of different ‘stakeholders’, so as to promote the goal of 
‘sustainable development’. This goal supposedly has three dimensions, ‘economic’, environmental’ and ‘social.’…” 
(p.15). His definition is, for the most part, consistent with Wood’s (1991) process-oriented stakeholder definition of 
CSR.  Finally, Waddock & Bodwell’s (2004:25) definition centers around the stakeholders, “as the way in which a 
company’s operating practices (policies, processes, and procedures) affect its stakeholders and the natural 
environment.”  
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psychology, sociology, and legal studies, as well as other disciplines such as ethics and 
international business.  Specifically, we present a framework which identifies a) the multiple 
actors (e.g., employees, consumers, management, institutional investors, governments, NGOs, 
and supra-national governmental entities) as shown in Figure 1, which push organizations to act 
in a socially responsible or irresponsible manner, and the b) instrumental, relational, and moral 
motives which lead each actor to push for positive social change as shown in Table 1.  We then 
discuss how actors’ motives within and across levels combine to encourage (discourage) CSR. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
In addition, we provide a unique theoretical model to address cross-national comparisons 
and discuss the key variables that will shape CSR across countries.  While there exist rich case 
studies describing CSR practices in individual countries (Gill & Leinbach, 1983; Kapelus, 2002; 
Wokutch, 1990) and studies analyzing the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in CSR 
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999; Dunning, 2003; Hooker & Madsen, 2004; Logsdon & Wood, 2002; 
Snider, Paul, & Martin, 2003), little attention has been paid to nations’ institutional and cultural 
effects on CSR efforts (Maignan, 2001; Maignan & Ralston, 2002 being the main exceptions).  
In this paper, we discuss how regulation, business practices, and employee attitudes towards 
CSR might differ across borders.  In sum, while research to date has been fruitful in pushing our 
knowledge of CSR forward, we hope to show that the theoretical model developed here will shed 
light on how social change might be triggered or precluded, and point to important contributions 
for researchers, managers and policy makers.  
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
Much that is written on CSR focuses on corporate social irresponsibility and the public’s 
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reaction to it (Aman, 2001; Cropanzano,Chrobot-Mason, Rupp, & Prehar, 2004).  For example, 
in 1996 it was alleged that Royal Dutch Shell supported the Nigerian military in its execution of 
the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and a number of other Ogoni community members for their political 
organizing against Shell.  The public outcry related to this event, and the contemporaneous 
environmental controversy over Shell’s decision to discard the Brent Spar oil drilling platform in 
the North Sea, caused Shell to change its social outlook and relationships with host countries and 
consumers. Shell re-evaluated its operating principles to establish clearer human rights 
guidelines, and issued its first social report, articulating a greater commitment to human rights 
and local community development programs going forward (Livesey & Kearins, 2002).  
Although this example represents reactive social change, there are also increasing 
examples of proactive social change, such as corporations engaging in “triple bottom line” 
thinking, which suggests an organization’s success hinges on economic profitability, 
environmental sustainability, and social performance (Hart & Milstein, 2003); giving greater 
visibility to CSR rankings (100 Best Corporate Citizens); incorporating emerging global 
standards of expected responsible conduct into their management systems (e.g. the U.N.’s Global 
Compact); and introducing accountability initiatives (e.g. SA 8000 and AA 1000) into their 
production processes and global supply chains (Waddock, et al., 2002).  Over half of the Fortune 
Global 500 MNCs produce a separate CSR report annually (Williams, 2004), and most have 
senior executives with responsibility for CSR efforts (The Economist, 2005). 
One premise in our analysis is that in either case (reactive or proactive CSR initiatives), 
corporations are being pressured by internal and external actors to engage in CSR actions to meet 
rapidly changing expectations about business and its social responsibilities (Cuesta Gonzalez & 
Valor Martinez, 2004; Clark & Hebb, 2004; The Economist, 2005).  Another premise is that 
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organizational practices such as CSR are exposed to decoupling effects, so that some companies 
introduce CSR practices at a superficial level for window dressing purposes while other 
companies embed CSR into their core company strategy (Weaver et al., 1999).  We further 
assume that companies’ responses to changing social expectations, and in particular their serious 
implementation of CSR initiatives into their strategic goals, have the potential to change not only 
the organizations’ corporate culture, but also to impart true social change. 
As one example, among many, of a corporation’s serious engagement with CSR 
initiatives leading to positive social change, we would point to the Chiquita company, which has 
implemented living wage standards for all of its farm workers in every country in which it 
harvests fruit, and which has introduced “state of the art” environmental practices throughout its 
supply chain (Taylor & Scharlin, 2004).  We assume that efforts such as Chiquita’s, which are 
being replicated by numerous other global companies in every sector, from extractives to apparel 
to pharmaceuticals to automotives and other heavy industry (Global Compact, 2005), can have 
positive impacts on the lives of individuals working for Chiquita, on communities in which 
Chiquita operates, and on eco-systems on which Chiquita depends.2  Thus, we seek to develop an 
analytic framework to understand, more systematically, pressures on companies to engage in 
such CSR initiatives.  
 
                                                 
2 The meaning of these initiatives, and our description of them as indicators of “positive social change,” can be 
contested.  The terms Logsdon and Wood use to describe the debates about the history of CSR are still apt, with 
CSR today being criticized from the “right side of the political spectrum” (Logsdon & Wood, 2002: 157) as too 
ambitious, with companies being asked to do too much of a political or social nature, thus potentially undermining 
firm economic performance (Henderson, 2001).  Conversely, CSR initiatives of the Chiquita variety are criticized 
from “the left side of the political spectrum” (Logsdon & Wood, 2002: 157) as insufficiently ambitious, not 
providing enough corporate social accountability or transparency for the exercise of power, and not changing power 
relationships between companies and the people and communities with which they interact (Matten & Crane, 2005).  
These are important debates, and we do not seek to minimize their significance. Yet, from the perspective of people 
in emerging economies newly given living wages, or indigenous people whose traditional lands and livelihoods are 
newly being protected, or community members who are newly being included in discussions of infrastructure 
investments, we construe the effects of serious CSR initiatives as positive social change. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We argue that at each level of analysis (individual employee, organizational, national, 
transnational), actors and interest groups have three main motives for pressuring firms to engage 
in CSR: instrumental (self-interest driven), relational (concerned with relationships among 
group members), and moral (concerned with ethical standards and moral principles).  A similar 
needs model was presented by Cropanzano and colleagues (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & 
Rupp, 2001; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001), which synthesized several decades 
of research and theory on employee justice perceptions.  
We seek to both refine and expand the multiple needs theory in two important ways.  
First, our exploration is more focused: we are looking not at general justice perceptions, but 
more specifically at intentional actions made by the firm in the name of social responsibility, and 
the impact of those actions on employees’ justice perceptions.  Second, our model is more 
expansive: We move beyond employee perceptions to theorize that the needs and motives of top 
management, consumers, national governments, and transnational entities to encourage firms to 
engage in CSR can also be understood using this multiple needs framework.  
In addition, our model makes several contributions to the CSR literature.  First, the field 
of organizational justice, which to date has resided almost exclusively in the micro 
organizational behavior and organizational psychology literatures, has much to offer CSR in 
considering the responsibilities of firms, the degree of firm accountability (Cropanzano, et al., 
2004), and how firms’ treatment of people, both internally and externally, affects a variety of 
actors (Masterson, 2001).  This analysis allows for a more socially-centered treatment of CSR, as 
opposed to the more economic approach that is often taken (Friedman, 1962; Henderson, 2001). 
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Second, the organizational justice literature has recently experienced a shift from 
instrumental, socio-economic models, to models that consider principled moral obligations of 
organizational actors (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003).  Using the multiple needs theory 
as a framework allows for the simultaneous consideration of instrumental, relational, and 
morality-based motives that various actors might act upon in putting pressure on firms to engage 
in CSR.  Such an approach provides a powerful framework by which to study the complex 
network of factors that may lead organizations to be more socially responsible, and if successful, 
impart social change.  Third, our model takes a different approach than existing CSR theories in 
that it considers the antecedents of CSR.  More specifically, we examine the factors that might 
lead various actors at various levels of analysis to push firms to engage in CSR.  This represents 
a unique treatment of CSR in that the majority of the existing models look at the consequences of 
CSR.  Lastly, we add value to the existing theoretical models because we are transposing 
theoretical constructs from the individual level to the organizational, national, and transnational 
level.  This gives us the flexibility to integrate the existing theories and research at each level of 
analysis while still using a comparable framework of analysis.  Considering one level and set of 
actors at a time, we discuss the antecedents of CSR and then turn to their interactions. 
Antecedents of CSR at the Individual Level 
We start our analysis at the individual level, specifically by examining why employees 
might push corporations to engage in CSR initiatives.  Surprisingly, employees as the unit of 
analysis have received scant attention in the CSR literature.3  Our individual-level framework, 
                                                 
3 Exceptions to this lack of research attention to employees include both Wood (1991) and Swanson (1995), who 
take a multilevel approach to studying corporate social performance (CSP), where they consider principles of CSP at 
institutional, organizational, and individual levels of analysis.  The “individual” in these models are individual 
managers or executives, who have discretion over a firm’s socially responsible (or irresponsible) actions.  More 
recent work by Logsdon & Wood (2004) has extended the micro level of analysis to more explicitly consider the 
instrumental and moral motivations of employees to engage in behaviors “consistent with global business 
citizenship.” 
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which is summarized in the first column of Table 1, draws from the research on employee justice 
perceptions (Cropanzano, Rupp, et al., 2001; Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001).  In this part of the 
model, we argue that employees’ perceptions of the firm’s external CSR are a special aspect of 
their more general justice perceptions, and that these CSR perceptions shape the employees’ 
subsequent attitudes and behaviors towards their firm.  In other words, we argue that employees’ 
CSR perceptions matter in that they predict outcomes such as performance, turnover, and well-
being.  Although our model does suggest that a firm, armed with the knowledge that employees’ 
perceptions have such effects, will be pressured and motivated to be more socially responsible 
(and ultimately lead to social change via serious firm engagement in CSR), the heart of our 
theoretical argument lies in predicting how employees react to the firm’s past socially 
responsible or irresponsible actions.   
Using the classic typology provided by the organizational justice literature (Colquitt, 
2001), we propose that employees make three distinct judgments about their employing 
organization’s CSR efforts.  That is, employees judge the social concern imbedded in an 
organization’s actions (procedural CSR), the outcomes that result from such actions (distributive 
CSR), and how individuals, both within and outside the organization, are treated interpersonally 
as these actions are carried out (interactional CSR). These judgments are similar to the self-
focused judgments of distributive (Adams, 1965), procedural (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and 
interactional (Bies, 2001; Bies & Moag, 1986) fairness studied in the justice area, but in this case 
focused on the organization’s impact on the broader social milieu (as opposed to simply how the 
employee is treated). These judgments then lead to a number of employee actions (mechanisms) 
that may place pressure on organizations to implement CSR initiatives. These actions as shown 
in Figure 2, include organizational attraction, commitment, and retention; job satisfaction and 
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performance; citizenship behaviors; and employee participation and leadership in CSR initiatives. 
In other words, employees push for CSR directly by actively advocating for, leading, and 
participating in CSR initiatives as well as indirectly by reciprocating socially responsible actions 
through heightened performance and firm loyalty/commitment. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Our argument is that employees who perceive their firm to be socially responsible will be 
more committed to the firm and out-perform (both in terms of their work as well as CSR 
activities) those employees who perceive a great deal of irresponsibility.  This should in turn 
pressure organizations to increase CSR activity in order to recruit and retain a top quality 
workforce.  Moreover, firm performance is likely to increase because employees see a socially 
responsible organization as a fair organization and reciprocate this fairness through dedication, 
loyalty, and increased productivity.  
Over the last 40 years, the justice research has consistently shown that employees’ 
perceptions of the fairness of their organization’s actions have a strong impact on their attitudes 
about and actions toward the firm (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, 
Porter, & Ng, 2001). Employees who perceive a great deal of fairness are committed, trusting, 
loyal, hardworking and are good citizens at work. Likewise, when a great deal of injustice is 
perceived, employees are likely to retaliate in the form of workplace sabotage and revenge 
(Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 
2002). In addition, Bies & Tripp (1998) demonstrate that there is a positive side of employee 
revenge, in that revenge is often socially motivated—meaning that employees’ retaliatory 
reactions to unfair organizational acts may lead organizations to change in a positive direction.  
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We believe that an organization’s social actions (positive or negative) provide employees 
with critical information to use in judging the fairness of organizations. Although much research 
in this area has focused on self-focused perceptions (i.e., how fair am I treated), recent studies 
have taken a more deontic approach, considering how individuals react to others being treated 
(un)justly (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger, 2001). In effect, it can be argued that 
an organization’s CSR efforts define its level of social justice. Just as fairness heuristic theory 
(Lind, 2001) predicts that fairness is used as a heuristic for trust, so do we propose that CSR is a 
heuristic for fairness. 
Following the work of justice scholars (Degoey, 2000; Greenberg, Bies, & Eskew, 1991; 
Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998), we view employee judgments of CSR as socially constructed, 
and also as social contagions that are communicated from one employee to another, and 
eventually spread to groups and entire organizations, shaping the organizational-level climate for 
CSR. Just as self-focused justice judgments create a “fairness climate” within groups (Colquitt, 
Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Simons & Roberson, 
2003), we propose that employee perceptions of CSR will combine to create an organizational 
climate for CSR, which contributes to the firm’s overall social reputation.  
There is empirical research showing that an organization’s social actions matter to its 
employees, although more work is needed in this area. For example, in two studies, Greening 
and Turban (2000; Turban & Greening, 1996) found that job applicants’ perceptions of a firm’s 
corporate social performance influenced their desire to work for a given firm. These authors 
employ both social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989) to demonstrate that individuals 
prefer to work for socially responsible firms because doing so bolsters their self-images; and 
signaling theory (Rynes, 1991) to show that employees use a firm’s social reputation to judge 
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what it would be like to work for the organization.  Research also indicates that employees’ 
perceptions of the firm’s social policies will impact their willingness to participate, contribute to, 
and initiate social change initiatives. For example, Ramus and Steger (2000) found that when 
employees perceived their employing organization to be strongly committed to environmental 
protection, they were more likely to generate ideas for making the firm’s practices more 
environmentally friendly. Further, the existence of a published environmental policy by the 
organization predicted employees’ willingness to attempt self-described environmental initiatives.  
Turning to the application of the justice framework to CSR, we examine how the 
instrumental, relational, and morality-based motives will push employees to influence CSR, and 
how these three types of concerns map onto individuals’ basic psychological needs (Williams, 
1997) for control, belongingness, and meaningful existence as shown in Table 1.  
Instrumental motives.  Instrumental models (Tyler, 1987) posit that we are motivated to 
seek control because control can serve to maximize the favorability of our outcomes. This ego-
based or self-serving concern for justice stems from the psychological need for control. That is, 
fair processes allow individuals to more accurately foretell an organization’s actions. Indeed, 
there exists decades of research supporting the instrumental motives of employees. This evidence 
stems from research on economic rationality (Sullivan, 1989), Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) 
control model, and classic formulations of social exchange theory (Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; 
Foa & Foa, 1980; Homans, 1974). In fact, many authors have argued that procedural justice 
concerns are inherently self-interested (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Shapiro, 1993; Tyler & Lind, 1992; 
Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996),4 and it has been demonstrated empirically that the presence of 
control improves individuals’ reactions to decisions made about them, due to expectations that 
                                                 
4 We state this with caution, however, in that the control need and subsequent outcomes are not always be self-
interested (see Cropanzano, et al., 2001; and Lind, 2001; for a discussion of this issue). This research focuses on 
instrumental motives but does not claim that all individuals do is instrumentally motivated. 
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process control leads to the maximization of outcomes in the long run (Folger, Cropanzano, 
Timmerman, Howes, & Mitchell, 1996; Rasinski, 1992; Roberson, Moye, & Locke, 1999). 
We extend this logic into the realm of CSR, by arguing that employees may view a 
socially engaged organization as one that is concerned about all people, both internal and 
external to the organization. The logic is that, if an organization has a general concern for 
fairness (e.g., respect and care for the environment, for working conditions), an employee may 
deduce that chances are, conditions will be fair for the employee who should be able to predict 
self-relevant events with reasonable accuracy, thus satisfying one’s need for control. Therefore 
employees seek and promote CSR in order to maximize their own outcomes. 
Relational motives.  Relational models (Tyler & Lind, 1992) show that justice conveys 
information about the quality of employees’ relationships with management. The quality of 
employees’ social exchange relationship with management (i.e. their status and standing within 
the organization) has a strong impact on employees’ sense of identity and self worth.  
This relational need for justice is inextricably linked to the psychological need of 
belongingness. It is the employee’s attachment to others from which self-identity is drawn 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Justice is generally seen as a mechanism for bringing people together, 
while injustice tends to pull them apart. A great deal of empirical evidence supports this notion. 
For example, we know that when employees feel they are treated fairly by their organization (by 
both the organization as a whole and the individuals in management positions), they are more 
likely to trust the organization (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994), feel supported by it (Masterson, Lewis, 
Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), and perceive high quality social exchange relationships with the 
organization/management (Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). Together, this research shows that when 
organizational authorities are trustworthy, unbiased, and honest, employees feel pride and 
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affiliation, and behave in ways that are beneficial to the organization (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 
1996; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). 
In our conceptualization of CSR, CSR fosters positive social relationships, both within 
and between organizations and communities, and therefore, relational needs become highly 
relevant. Indeed, Clary and Snyder (1999) note that CSR allows for the creation and 
strengthening of social relationships as well as the reduction of negative feelings associated with 
an alleged bad relationship between an organization and its community.  
What we posit, then, is a chain reaction caused (or not caused) by an organization’s CSR 
efforts. That is, as explained above, employees have a psychological need to belong—to be 
legitimate members of valued social groups. In organizations, they often rely on their justice 
perceptions to deduce if they have such status and thus if their needs for belongingness are met 
(Lind, 2001). Employees desire that organizations act in a socially responsible manner, not only 
because CSR gives employees a general sense of the organization’s concern for treating all 
people fairly, but also because CSR initiatives require employees and management to work 
together toward a greater good, providing employees with additional experiences with which to 
judge both management’s social concerns and relational quality. 
Morality-based motives. A third major psychological need is the need for meaningful 
existence. Folger (2001) claims that most individuals share a basic respect for human dignity and 
worth—and this morality-based concern for justice drives our attraction to, dealings with, and 
reactions to organizations. Here concern is shifted from what serves one’s economic self-interest 
or group status, to what people view as ethically appropriate (Cropanzano, et al., 2003). In this 
sense, one is drawn to what one feels is just, independent of how the actions affect one 
personally. The multiple needs model argues that to strive for what is morally or ethically “right”, 
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rather than simply what is instrumental, a transcendent principle of human behavior and a 
fundamental reason must exist. This model is supported by empirical evidence that individuals 
show a great concern for fairness even when there is no apparent economic benefit for doing so 
and the recipient of the just or unjust act is a stranger (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; 
Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002), suggesting that virtue may be its own reward 
(Folger, 1998; Cropanzano, Byrne et al., 2001).  It is important to note, however, that even 
though universal justice norms may exist, individual differences come into play as well.  
Greenberg (2002) found that employee theft was most likely in situations where no corporate 
ethics program was in place, and employees were low in moral development. This highlights the 
notion that the moral actions of the firm interact with the moral concerns of employees in 
influencing their behaviors within the organizational context.   
What this means for CSR is that employees will seek to work for, remain in, and get 
attached to organizations whose organizational strategies are consistent with the employees’ 
moral or ethical frameworks, and this preference may, at times, supersede employees’ 
instrumental and relational motives (Folger, et al., in press).  Moral motives will also have the 
potential to influence employees’ participation in various CSR initiatives, meaning they not only 
desire to be involved with initiatives seen as directly impacting themselves or groups they 
identify with, but also with causes they feel are fundamentally just and relevant to the 
establishment of a moral community. For example, Barbian (2001) presents evidence that many 
individuals are willing to take less pay in order to work for a socially responsible firm.  In light 
of the discussion of these three individual level motives, we suggest: 
Proposition 1. Individual employees' needs for control, for belongingness, and for a 
meaningful existence will lead them to push firms to engage in social change through 
CSR. 
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Interactions between Employee Motives: An Upward Hierarchy 
There has been a great deal of debate in the justice literature about the existence of and 
interplay between instrumental and morality-based justice motives (with relational motives 
falling somewhere in between) and unfortunately there is no consensus to date on how such 
motives interact. Some research suggests, however, that meaningful existence motives and needs 
may be especially salient in CSR contexts. For example, Lerner (2003) shows that in situations 
of minimal importance, when little is at stake, and when individuals have the time and cognitive 
resources to think calculatively, they are likely to be most concerned with their self-interest (i.e., 
needs for control are most salient). Conversely, when a situation involves matters of serious 
consequence, individuals are likely to respond with strong emotions, and such emotions engage 
needs and motives that are much more moral/ethical in nature (i.e., meaningful existence). 
Furthermore, evidence for morality-based justice motives is shown to be especially strong in 
dialogues involving social issues (Bobocel, Son Hing, & Zanna, 2002; Skitka, 2002).  
We posit that organizations’ socially responsible or irresponsible acts are of serious 
consequence to employees. We are reminded of the strong case being made by deonance 
researchers (Folger, et al., in press), that due to the close link between injustice and immorality, 
employees’ responses to corporate irresponsibility may involve strong emotions and behaviors, 
which could transcend any short-term economic interests.  
Therefore, we propose that the needs for control, belongingness, and meaningful 
existence are ordered in an upward hierarchy such that employees will exert the most pressure on 
organizations to engage in CSR when their needs for meaningful existence are paramount, 
followed by belongingness and control. Said differently, the relationship between the motives is 
an additive one, yet deontic motives carry greater weight in determining the total “CSR 
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motivation” held by each employee. Table 2 exemplifies how this relationship could be 
summarized if we were to write an equation to conceptually illustrate the relationship.  
It is important to note that individual differences exist in the extent to which such needs 
are ordered (Cropanzano, et al., 2003). What this suggests is that those who place the most value 
on human worth and a greater good are the most likely to fight for CSR.   
Proposition 1a. An upward hierarchical ordering of motives among individual employees 
will lead to stronger firm pressure to engage in social change through CSR. 
 
Antecedents of CSR at the Organizational Level 
 In this section, we explore the pressures that firm insider groups (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997), chiefly owners (shareholders) and managers, and outsider groups, chiefly consumers,5 
exert on firms to adopt socially responsible initiatives.  We frame our model around two 
assumptions.  First, although the firm’s main goal is to survive by means of achieving 
competitive advantage in the economic market, there exist different mechanisms to sustain firm 
survival and efficiency.  Second, firms do not operate in a vacuum.  Rather, they are embedded 
in national and industry6 institutional settings that enable their strategic decisions (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; North, 1990).  Hence, in this section, we also compare organizational actors 
across national settings. 
Actors at the organizational level possess different mechanisms to influence social 
change depending on whether they are insiders or outsiders (See Figure 2).  Insiders, such as the 
TMT (Top Management Team), have the most direct power to influence the firm’s engagement 
in CSR by developing corporate strategy and allocating resources to different firm programs and 
                                                 
5 We recognize that consumers primarily act as individuals, and so can be evaluated at the individual level, just as 
employees often act collectively through labor unions, even though we have looked at them as individuals in the 
prior section.  Here, we categorize consumers as an outsider stakeholder group at the organizational level since that 
is how they are treated in the stakeholder view of the firm, while recognizing their high resource interdependence 
with the focal firm (Frooman, 1999).  See also Harrison & Freeman (1999). 
6 For the sake of describing our theoretical model, we will not discuss industry differences.  We recognize, however, 
that empirical investigations should pay close attention to industry characteristics. 
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practices. Organizational studies have shown that a firm’s decision-making process is a political 
process where on the one hand, there is a negotiation among members of the dominant coalition 
(Cyert & March, 1963), and on the other hand, the decision-making power is given to those 
actors with the resources to exercise their power (Pfeffer, 1992).  This suggests that managers 
wanting the firm to become involved in CSR activities, will need to have the power to put CSR 
on the agenda and to align the activities with the firm’s strategic goals.  The politics of decision-
making are thus a key factor in this process of change within the organization, one that may be 
affected by the motives of the TMT for instigating CSR efforts.  
Outsider groups usually exercise their influence on the firm through voice.  For example, 
consumers exercise their voice individually through their purchasing power decisions (Waddock, 
et al., 2002), such as a willingness to pay more for fair trade goods (Smith, 1990). Yet, 
consumers’ purchasing decisions can ultimately become consumer movements utilizing classic 
social movement strategies, such as boycotts, as in the case of the anti-genetically engineered 
food and crops campaigns in the EU or the anti-Nike activists in the 1990s in the U.S. (Kozinets 
& Handleman, 2004).  Marketing empirical research has demonstrated that most companies are 
very sensitive to their CSR image, and are becoming increasingly aware of the strong positive 
relationship between the firm’s CSR actions and consumers’ reaction to the firms’ products, as 
well as the negative effects when CSR efforts are deleterious or not perceived as legitimate 
(Creyer & Ross, 1997; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001).  We turn our attention to the other side of the 
equation, that is, what are the motives for consumers as a stakeholder group to pressure firms to 
engage in CSR?  Thus, in the next section, we extend the employee multiple needs model 
described above to the organizational level of analysis in order to examine insider and outsider 
groups’ instrumental, relational and moral motives for pressuring firms to engage (or not) in 
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CSR, as summarized in Table 1.  
Instrumental motives.  The owners are the managers of the firm when there is no 
separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932).  The rise of the modern corporation 
led to a separation of ownership and management, with different ownership models.  Firm 
ownership structure, generally defined as ownership type (families, individuals, states, etc.) and 
ownership concentration, also varies across countries with important consequences for firm 
strategic decision making (Aguilera, 2005).  
The corporate governance literature divides the corporate world into two national models 
(Albert, 1991). The Anglo-American model (exemplified by the U.S.) is characterized by 
dispersed ownership expecting short-term returns, strong shareholder rights, arm's length 
creditors financing through equity, active markets for corporate control, and flexible labor 
markets. The Continental model (exemplified by Germany and Japan) is characterized by 
long-term debt finance, ownership by large blockholders, weak markets for corporate control, 
and rigid labor markets.  We argue that short-term shareholder interests within the Anglo-
American model may have some instrumental motives to push for CSR (see Table 1) when CSR 
initiatives are directly related to greater competitiveness of the firm, as in the case of protecting 
corporate reputation (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) or engaging in impression management 
tactics (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). Conversely, owners in the Continental model, such as banks, 
the state, or employees, will tend to set longer-term expectations for profitability and include a 
broader set of constituents in their strategic thinking, such as promoting long-term employee 
welfare or investing in research and development of high-quality products (Hall & Soskice, 
2001).  These owners might also have instrumental motives for persuading the firm to engage in 
CSR efforts when those efforts are compatible with long-term profitability.  For example, Bansal 
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and Roth (2000) provide qualitative evidence that some Japanese firms’ ecological 
responsiveness is motivated by long-term competitiveness.  We categorize this as an 
instrumental motive 
With the emergence of the shareholder rights movement in the late 1980s (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994), institutional investors became particularly active owners (relative to other 
types of owners), especially within the Anglo-American model.  Investments made by 
institutional investors tend to be large, so they cannot move in and out of firms without paying a 
price.  Therefore, institutional investors tend to exercise voice rather than exit.  Among 
institutional investors, mutual funds and investment banks operate under similar premises as 
shareholder-value maximizing owners: emphasizing short-term profitability supported by growth 
strategies such as mergers and acquisitions, as opposed to internal development of new products 
and R&D expenditures.  Pressures to show short-term returns make these owners predisposed to 
support investing resources in socially responsible initiatives only when there is an immediate 
association with profits, such as enhancing short-term competitiveness. 
Outsider organizational actors such as consumers might have some instrumental motives 
for pushing firms to engage in CSR, for instance when environmental stewardship creates 
products that are perceived as healthier.  Trentmann (2001) shows that (moderate) socially 
responsible consumers seek changes in business practices in order to protect “healthy and 
employed consumers.”  The intensity of consumer’s instrumental motives is likely to vary across 
countries contingent on how consumers’ perceive the role of the firm and CSR (Maignan, 2001).  
Yet, in general, consumer motives to be concerned with CSR are conceived as relational or 
moral, as discussed below. 
Relational motives.  Organizational-level actors’ relational motives to pressure firms to 
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engage in CSR efforts can be observed by adopting a stakeholder theory of the firm (Brammer, 
2003; Clarkson, 1995; Rowley & Moldoveau, 2003; Wheeler, Colbert, & Freeman, 2003).  
Generally speaking, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones, 
1995) accounts for the diversity of stakeholder interests, and their competition for firm resources. 
When the owners have stakeholder-maximizing interests, they will act to ensure the well-being 
of the different groups engaged in a relationship with the firm.  For example, German owners 
might be in favour of investing in suppliers’ R&D because it is likely to lead to long-term 
benefits for the firm, or a Japanese firm might prefer to borrow from a domestic bank in order to 
develop long-term trust that will lead to a future safety net.  Thus, managers in the Continental 
model are likely to encourage the firm to engage in CSR when stakeholders’ interests will be 
fulfilled, as they are driven not only by short-term profit maximization, but primarily by 
relational motives such as long-term growth, the need for social legitimation, and achieving 
balance among different constituents of the firm (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).   
Even in a shareholder wealth-maximizing framework, firms seek social legitimation in 
order to survive.  Legitimation is seen as a relational motive as it refers to a concern for how the 
firm’s actions are perceived by others. Firms within a given industry are confined by the specific 
norms, values and beliefs of that industry, some of which are enacted into law.  Firms have 
relational motives to engage in the CSR practices of their industry in order to be seen as 
legitimate by complying with industry norms and regulations, as well as instrumental motives to 
pre-empt bad publicity, institutional investor disinvestment, and penalties due to non-compliance 
(Kagan, Gunningham, & Thornton, 2003).  Thus, organizational actors are likely to engage in 
CSR to emulate their peers in order to preserve their social legitimacy (Schuman, 1985) by 
preventing negative perceptions, and to ensure the organization’s long-term survival (Meyer & 
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Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977) and social license to operate (Livesey, 2001).  This specific TMT 
relational motive is empirically validated in Bansal and Roth’s (2000) study of why companies 
“go green,” and Bansal’s (2005) mimicry arguments. 
In contrast to mutual fund owners, discussed above, some public pension funds, labor 
funds, and Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds have a much longer time horizon than 
do mutual funds and investment banks, and consequently exhibit stronger relational motives. 
These investors emphasize long-term stakeholder interests and social legitimacy by investing in 
firms that meet high labor or environmental standards, or which are responsive to the 
communities in which they operate and the people they employ (Johnson & Greening, 1999).  
The case of “noisy” pension funds activists, such as CalPERS, is illustrative of how some public 
pension funds have acted as catalysts for CSR initiatives in corporations by conducting highly 
public screening of corporations that might lead to brand damage and deterioration of firm 
reputation (Clark & Hebb, 2004).  Johnson and Greening (1999) have shown that pension funds’ 
long-term orientation is positively associated with higher corporate social performance.  
Similarly, SRI funds exhibit a broader range of concerns than short-term profit maximization, 
combining analysis of firms’ social and environmental performance with more traditional 
financial analysis in constructing their investment portfolios (Lydenberg, 2005).  We construe 
these motives as significantly relational, being aimed at promoting the interests of suppliers (e.g. 
usage of non-toxic materials), customers (e.g. offer environmental products), employees (e.g. 
adequate labour conditions), and other stakeholders in the firm, and not merely seeking short-
term shareholder returns. 
Social movement research has turned its attention to the cultural frames, identity and 
meaning of group members and the use of that collective identity to pursue conscious strategic 
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efforts.  In this regard, consumer groups and “market campaign” activists in CSR tend to share 
certain understanding of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate their collective 
action (McAdam, McCarthy, & Mayer, 1996).  We argue that the collective identity of 
consumers is a relational motive that will lead them to pressure companies to engage in CSR 
practices.  Collective identity in social movements refers to “the interactive, shared definition 
produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) ... that must be conceived as 
a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that 
link individuals (or groups) [to the movement]” (Melluci; 1995: 43).   
The U.S. paper campaign in 2000 to end production of paper from endangered forests and 
increase sales of recycled paper (i.e., Paper Campaign 2000), which focused on Staples as a 
central target, is a good example of how members in this consumer activist group build a 
collective identity to achieve their goals.  This relational motive or strong collective identity 
among group members is developed not only around CSR issues, but also more broadly on an 
ideological basis.  From Kozinets and Handelman’s (2004), we argue that in more radical 
varieties of consumer movements such as the anti-Nike activists (Holt, 2002; Shaw, 1999) or the 
anti-genetically engineered food and crop activist coalition (Schurman, 2004), the relational 
dynamics tend to be even more salient.  
Moral motives.  Stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) suggests 
that organizational actors bring their personal morality-based values into the firm, which might 
go beyond economic interests or self-fulfillment.  Hence, moral motives to pressure companies 
to engage in social change via CSR initiatives may come from organizational actors whose 
deontic motives are particularly salient.  Organizational actors within firms, such as TMTs, make 
decisions based on their cognitive biases and personal values (Cyert & March, 1963) which will 
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diffuse to the overall organizational values and business ethics.  In addition, Hartman (1996) 
argues that what is desirable and valuable, and what constitutes a good life in an organization, is 
contingent on the conditions of the community and the autonomy of the decision-makers.  
Logsdon and Wood (2002) have posited that organizational actors operating in a global 
business context may have moral motives (and indeed duties) to engage in “small experiments” 
to try to bring about a fairer world, and to correct the “imbalances of wealth, class, gender, race, 
culture, [and] religion.”  When organizational actors act according to stewardship interests by 
instigating social and moral actions towards a better society, then they are likely to inject CSR 
initiatives in their firm strategies, leading to social change.  For example, the majority owners at 
Ford share a sense of commitment to the world’s scarce resources and consequently they have 
articulated a formal commitment to becoming the world’s largest recycler of automobile parts, in 
part to preempt future regulation (instrumental motives) but also to actuate their concern for the 
social good (moral motives) (Howard-Grenville & Hoffman, 2003).  
Consumers, as an outsider stakeholder group, also push for CSR out of morality-based 
motives, or higher order values.  Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) discuss that the macrosocial 
contract includes mechanism by which stakeholders can demand ethical obligations on firms via 
voice, consent and exit (p.246).  Existing case studies on consumer activism indicate that there 
exists an increasingly mobilized social group of consumers, often referred to as the “ethical 
shopping movement” (Harrison, 2003), with the capacity to impact brand image and corporate 
reputation for the sake of the greater good (or universal morality) and long-term sustainability.  
When consumers share a common meaning frame, are organized in networks, and have the 
capacity to damage corporations—mostly by boycotting products (Davidson, Abuzar, & Worrell, 
1995)—in the name of society’s collective good, they are likely to influence the company to 
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engage in CSR initiatives.  For example, when Nike was accused of allegedly using sweatshops 
in their offshore operations, consumer groups mobilized to boycott their products (Knight & 
Greenberg, 2002) influencing Nike to introduce changes in their global labor practices.  Research 
on brand image shows that given the choice, some consumers will pay more for a product from a 
“good” company (Sen, Gurham-Canli, & Morwitz, 2001), as in the case of Ben & Jerry´s ice 
cream, with variations in consumer perceptions about the importance of CSR across countries 
(Maignan, 2001; Maignan & Ferrell, 2003).  We have now argued that consumers will not only 
pressure firms to engage in CSR, but that these communities will also have different motives to 
do so.  These three motives lead us to suggest the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.  Internal and external organizational actors’ (shareholders, managers, 
consumers) shareholder interests, stakeholder interests and stewardship interests will lead 
them to push firms to engage in social change through CSR. 
 
Interactions between Organizational-Level Motives: Insider Downward Hierarchy and 
Outsider Upward Hierarchy  
 
This discussion of organizational level CSR motives addressed each motive separately so 
as to highlight the motives that influence internal and external social groups to demand higher 
CSR from firms.  In practice, all organizational motives will be working simultaneously, yet 
some motives will be more salient than others.  Although the specific manner in which these 
motives are combined is ultimately an empirical question, which will depend on the specific 
circumstances of each firm, it is still necessary to discuss how such process might play out at this 
level.  To do so, we focus on the interactions of one key insider group, managers, and how their 
motives are ordered hierarchically (see Table 2).  Then, we will briefly extrapolate from the 
managerial interactions to outsider stakeholders, such as consumers, and how they might 
prioritize their motives to push to trigger social change.   
Managers are key insiders of the firm and they not only process the signals from owners 
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and consumers’ multiple motives, but they have their own multiple motives to engage in CSR.  
For example, when Rom Rattray of Procter & Gamble was asked about the firm’s initiative to 
produce less environmentally damaging, concentrated detergents, which have saved P &G 
millions of dollars since 1992 by reducing both production and shipping costs, he stated: “We are 
not doing this because it saves money in Cincinnati.  We’re doing it because it’s the right thing 
to do and saves money” (Mehegan, 1996), illustrating multiple managerial motives.  Previous 
empirical research has noted that variance in viewpoints often exists within TMTs on issues such 
as ecological responses (Bansal & Roth, 2000) or ethics programs (Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 
1999).  Here, we seek to conceptualize the nature of the relationship between instrumental, 
relational and moral motives that will lead the top management team to push for positive social 
change activities, such as increased resources and effort directed at CSR initiatives. 
 We argue that, first and foremost, managers will implement CSR initiatives when these 
align with their instrumental interests of enhancing shareholder value and increasing firm 
competitiveness and profitability, so that managers can ensure firm survival and raise their 
compensation packages, which are generally tied to profitability.  Although existing research has 
demonstrated that firms’ corporate social performance leads to higher profitability (Orlitzky, et 
al., 2003), it is important to highlight that this is not always going to be obvious to the TMT, 
particularly when short-term versus long-term benefits seem to conflict.  Thus, TMTs will 
incorporate CSR in their organizational strategies only when doing so is clearly associated with 
greater economic opportunities, such as cost reduction and higher competitive advantage, as in 
the case of green marketing (Smith, 1990).  We place the most weight on this motive and assume 
it is a necessary condition for action to take place.  
 From a relational perspective, managers have external pressures from stakeholders and 
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other companies in the organizational field, and these might push their company towards greater 
CSR.  For example, managers might want to engage in CSR because doing so is presumed to 
enhance corporate legitimacy and thus contribute to corporate profitability, even if those 
practices are merely “window dressing” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).   Managers will also justify 
CSR initiatives when there are external pressures to avoid social sanctions (protests, negative 
press, diminished reputation and image) that might damage their relations with shareholders.  
 We also know that TMTs have a powerful effect over organizational values (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) and that they may act out of deonance, or a moral obligation to “do the right 
thing.” The stewardship literature argues that managers might have broader interests than self-
fulfillment (Davis et al., 1997) and that TMTs’ characteristics—including values—play a critical 
role in influencing organizational actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).   
 Combined, this evidence suggests that TMTs have multiple motives to develop CSR 
initiatives in the firm and, as with employees, these motives can be conflicting.  However, there 
will almost always be a hierarchy of motives.  We assert that for insider organizational actors 
(i.e., TMTs) to be strongly motivated to engage in effective, strategically-managed CSR 
initiatives, they will seek to fulfill instrumental motives first, i.e., they will see the instrumental 
value of these initiatives, followed by relational motives and finally moral motives.  Thus, we 
argue that there is a downward hierarchical ordering of insider organizational actors’ motives 
which are predictive of commitment to CSR, and which can be synthesized in an additive 
hierarchical fashion as illustrated in Table 2.  
Proposition 2a. A downward hierarchical ordering of motives among insider 
organizational actors (i.e., TMTs) will lead to stronger firm pressure to engage in social 
change through CSR. 
 
 Conversely, outsider organizational actors such as “ethical consumer groups” will have 
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an indirect effect on the firms’ decision-making.  We propose that such outsider organizational 
actors are primarily seeking to advance social benefits closely linked to moral motives, followed 
by relational and instrumental.  Thus, these outsider actors will prioritize their motives in an 
upward hierarchical ordering similar to the relationships described above for employees as 
synthesized in Table 2. We suggest the following proposition: 
Proposition 2b. An upward hierarchical ordering of motives among outsider 
organizational actors (i.e., consumers) will lead to stronger pressure on the firm to engage 
in social change through CSR.  
 
Antecedents of CSR at the National Level 
Government action, both enacting laws and enforcing them, is an important factor 
influencing firms to implement CSR initiatives and so become agents of social change as shown 
in Figure 2.  As one example, the governments of France, Germany and the UK have each passed 
laws requiring pension funds to disclose the extent to which they consider the social and 
environmental records of the companies in which they invest (Aaronson & Reeves, 2002).  These 
laws have encouraged pension funds and their investment managers to pay more attention to 
companies’ social and environmental performance, creating additional pressures for companies 
to consider those issues as well (Williams & Conley, 2005).  The laws governments pass to 
encourage CSR are uniquely powerful because they are mandatory, and so can achieve broader 
coverage than voluntary initiatives such as the U.N. Global Compact (substantive human rights 
standards) or the Global Reporting Initiative (social, economic and environmental disclosure 
format).  Moreover, laws set social expectations about responsible corporate behavior that are 
then reinforced by other actors such as consumers, NGOs, and institutional investors (Kagan et 
al., 2003).   
A cross-national comparison suggests that government actions through promulgating and 
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enforcing laws help to create unique CSR climates that vary across countries (Campbell, 2005).  
The governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have been 
particularly active in promulgating CSR initiatives domestically and promoting CSR discourse 
transnationally, and France, Finland, Germany and South Africa have recently enacted domestic 
CSR regulations (Aaronson & Reeves, 2002; Cuesta Gonzalez & Valor Martinez, 2004). In 
contrast, the U.S. government was engaged in promoting CSR initiatives in specific industries, 
such as apparel (the Apparel Industry Partnership) and, extractives (the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights in oil, gas, and mining) during the Clinton administration (Schrage, 
2003).  
 Governments’ motivations to establish high standards for CSR can be identified as 
instrumental, relational or moral. Defining and categorizing these motives leads to a greater 
understanding of when governments might push companies to engage in CSR initiatives. 
Instrumental Motives.  In developed countries, creating a competitive business climate 
domestically and encouraging economic development internationally, in which one’s country’s 
flagship companies participate, are major functions of governments’ economic policies.  Thus, 
governments have instrumental reasons to promote CSR policies to the extent those policies are 
understood to promote international competitiveness. CSR is seen to increase competitive 
advantage by fueling innovation, enhancing customer reputation, creating high performance 
workplaces, and maintaining important intangible assets, such as community trust or employee 
goodwill (U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, 2003). CSR is also recognized as a useful risk 
management strategy, as it requires managers to communicate with a range of stakeholders to 
identify longer-term social, economic and environmental risks, and incorporate thinking about 
those risks into strategic development (U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, 2004).  To 
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varying degrees, developed country governments also acknowledge that their flagship companies 
represent the country internationally: Coca-Cola and McDonalds are the face of the United States 
internationally, just as British Petroleum (BP) is the face of the U.K. internationally (Freeman, 
Pica, & Camponovo, 2001).  Thus, home country governments have an economic interest in their 
flagship companies exhibiting high standards of CSR abroad, and thereby reducing the chance of 
the company becoming a target for reprisal, negative publicity or boycotts based on a poor record 
of CSR.   
Relational Motives.  The governments that have been the most active in promoting CSR 
explicitly articulate a number of relational motives, clustering around the idea that companies 
have responsibilities to promote social cohesion and to address problems of social exclusion 
(Aaronson & Reeves, 2002).  These governments recognize a partnership between companies 
and the societies in which they are embedded, with a particular focus on incorporating the 
economically marginalized and socially disfavored into the mainstream (e.g. promoting “social 
inclusion” (December 2000 Nice European Council Social Agenda; Goebel, 1993).  Creating 
conditions for socially excluded people to belong to society at large, and to participate in its 
goals and material well-being, is an important part of the social benefits envisioned by the 
governments identified above as promoting CSR.  These are also countries that recognize a 
“social partnership” between labor, business and communities, and obligations on business to 
fully participate in that partnership (Streeck & Yamamura, 2001). We see these efforts as 
strongly relational at their core, being concerned with developing effective relationships between 
multiple parties, particularly the marginalized and socially insecure in relation to the powerful 
and socially secure. 
Moral Motives.  Inherent in the social partnership idea is an understanding that 
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companies have a collective responsibility to contribute to a better society.  In Europe, the UK, 
and Canada, where governments have been particularly active in encouraging or requiring CSR 
efforts, there is a strong sense of collective responsibility for social conditions (Hofstede, 1980),  
and an identification of corporations as members of society with a responsibility to make positive 
contributions to better social conditions (Brown, 2003).  As U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Gordon Brown has articulated it, corporate CSR efforts are part of the “building blocks” of a 
new economic order that governments have a moral obligation to support and develop in order to 
“advance social justice on a global scale.” (Brown, 2003:331).  In calling for a new global 
consensus, Chancellor Brown called for the rejuvenation of “the earlier notion that an acceptable 
and sustainable international regime requires a moral underpinning.”  (Brown, 2003: 322).  This 
new consensus rests, importantly, on a moral view of individuals as rights bearers who are 
understood to deserve material and environmental conditions that permit human flourishing 
(Nussbaum, 1992), while the specific intellectual and political traditions and history of each 
country will affect how that moral imperative is understood and articulated.  
In light of these three motives, we suggest:  
Proposition 3.  Governments’ interests in establishing competitive business environments, 
promoting social cohesion, and fostering collective responsibility for the betterment of 
society will lead them to push firms to engage in social change through CSR. 
 
Interactions between Government Motives: A Compensatory Relationship 
We assume that governments will most vigorously advance CSR policies when they see 
instrumental value in promoting business competitiveness, but we also assume it does not matter 
as much why governments are acting as far as they act to exert social change.  In other words, we 
conceptualize the relationship among government motivations to take an additive and 
compensatory nature. This suggests that the total government CSR motivation can be a function 
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of any combination of motivations, that no particular hierarchical ordering is presupposed, and 
that a deficit of one motivation can be compensated for with a surfeit of another (Table 2).  
What this indicates is that governments will have different relative priorities of  
motivations, but that it is the total motivation to pressure companies to enact CSR policies that 
matters given the unique nature of the power of government actions to influence firms. For 
example, neo-liberal government might allocate low priority to social cohesion because their 
political agenda suggests that national competitiveness will lead to greater economic prosperity, 
which will in turn lead to greater social cohesiveness, and yet such a government might still 
enact CSR policies if a link between CSR and competitiveness was understood.  
Proposition 3a. A compensatory relationship of motives in governments will lead to 
stronger firm pressure to engage in social change through CSR. 
 
Antecedents of CSR at the Transnational Level  
Many legal scholars have argued that the essence of the CSR concern is the global reach 
of multinational corporations in contrast with the domestic reach of structuring regulation (Aman, 
2001), as well as the concern that mobile capital and production will flee jurisdictions with 
onerous regulation (Sassen, 1996).  Given the absence of global government, globalization is 
understood to have produced a regulatory vacuum, where no single state has the capacity to 
regulate the totality of any global company’s activities. 
Yet, this concern may construe the category “regulation” too narrowly.  Habermas [1962] 
(1989) has put forth the idea of a public sphere comprised of multiple strands of civil society 
discourse.  In the global sphere, these discourses can articulate norms that are potentially 
transformative (Guidry, Kennedy, & Zald, 2000:13), and as such, have been understood as 
regulation in a world of global governance without government (Scott, 2003).  Global CSR 
discourses provide a good example of both the multiplicity of voices in the transnational public 
 32
sphere, and the potential transformative impact of “simple” articulations of norms (Barnett & 
Duvall, 2005). There are several mechanisms by which transnational actors pressure firms to 
engage in CSR, such as campaigns, boycotts or multi-party dialogues, as shown in Figure 2.  
Among the transnational actors that push firms to enact CSR policies are non-
governmental advocacy organizations (NGOs).  These include NGOs with a broad social justice 
or environmental mission, such as Oxfam or Christian Aid, as well as NGOs whose work is 
specific to CSR, such as AccountAbility or SustainAbility. NGOs have become a powerful and 
politically significant social force in the last few decades (Hart & Milstein, 2003; Khagram, 
Riker, & Sikkink, 2002; Sikkink & Smith, 2002).  Labor unions can be understood as a sub-
category of NGOs, and our analysis will treat them as such. There are also corporate interest 
groups engaged in CSR discourses, either those with a specific CSR focus, such as the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, or those with a broader pro-business focus, such 
as the World Economic Forum’s Corporate Citizenship Project. 
Another category of actors at the transnational level are inter-governmental organizations 
(IGOs), such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and the United Nations (UN).  IGOs are simultaneously actors that press 
companies to consider CSR, and the institutional arena in which the discourses (and conflicts) 
between business, civil society and governments take place (Khagram et al., 2002). For example, 
the EU is convening on-going discussions of CSR and developing norms of responsible business 
conduct.   
Increasingly, there have also been multi-party dialogues between companies, NGOs, 
IGOs, unions, institutional investors (particularly SRI investors or activist pension fund 
investors) and governments acting in the transnational public sphere (Williams, 2004; Cuesta 
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Gonzalez & Valor Martinez, 2004).  These multi-party dialogues either address specific CSR 
issues, such as food safety or extractive industry security arrangements, or address general 
expectations of corporate accountability, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”) multi-
stakeholder process to develop a common framework for triple-bottom line reporting (Guay, Doh, 
& Sinclair, 2004).  
From these diverse quarters, multiple norms of responsible corporate behavior are being 
articulated at the transnational level, some with demonstrated transformative power.  The GRI is 
a good example, with over 300 global companies using its framework for comprehensive triple 
bottom line reporting, including world leading MNCs (e.g. Ford, GM, Shell, and BP).  Again, we 
seek to identify the instrumental, relational and moral motives of three sets of important actors 
that function at this level: NGOs, business interest groups, and IGOs.  
Instrumental Motives. We assume that NGOs are not acting from primarily instrumental 
motives in their CSR engagement, and yet they have survival needs, and thus compete for 
limited resources, members, and influence.  Established, respected NGOs will resist upstarts 
(Zadek, 2001).  We describe these instrumental interests as a power motive, recognizing that the 
purpose of seeking that power is not predominantly self-interested.  Rather, power is a necessary 
condition for the NGOs to advance their external goals, such as global human rights (Amnesty 
International or Human Rights Watch), economic justice (Oxfam or Christian Aid), or 
environmental protection (Friends of the Earth).  We posit that corporate interest groups’ motives 
for engagement in the transnational CSR discourse are more strongly instrumental than are the 
motivations of other NGOs, and tend to shape discussion of CSR in ways that are consistent with 
business interests (Livesey & Kearins, 2002), to build support for globalization, and to forestall 
prescriptive government regulation (Williams & Conley, 2005). 
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IGOs as transnational institutional actors have the same instrumental motives to push for 
CSR as do national government: promoting business competitiveness.  The European 
Commission, which has identified sustainable development as a key to becoming “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world,” sees CSR as an important 
contribution to achieving that goal (European Commission 2001).  It also is strongly motivated 
to encourage a level playing field across countries, on both corporate governance and CSR, so 
that no member state is disadvantaged by having more protective social or environmental 
legislation than any other (European Commission 2001).  Another locus of intergovernmental 
CSR activity is the OECD, which revised its 1976 Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises in 
1998 to include CSR standards, using an explicit government, business, labor and civil society 
(NGO) framework for the negotiations.  These revisions emphasize that good corporate 
governance and responsibility are “a key part of the contract that underpins economic growth in 
a market economy and public faith in that system” (Witherell, 2002).   
Relational Motives. Transnational NGOs act in significant part through multi-party 
relationships, partnerships with companies, information networks, coalitions that coordinate 
strategies, and as part of social movements (Hart & Milstein, 2003; Khagram et al., 2002).  Thus, 
the act of aligning interests with others by establishing and maintaining collaborative 
relationships is at the center of NGOs’ modes of action. This often involves shifting conceptual 
frames of understanding and moral suasion in transnational multi-party dialogues, which can 
result in the “quasi-regulation” of articulating new norms (Scott, 2003). Given the centrality of 
partnerships to NGOs’ success, their relational motives can be framed as instrumental as well.7 
 In evaluating motives at the IGO level, we recognize that both the EU and the OECD 
                                                 
7 The recognition that collaborative relationships can also serve instrumental goals is a classic formulation of social 
exchange theory (Gergen, 1969; Hatfield, Walster, & Pilavin, 1978). 
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operate in geographic and political contexts where social cohesion is highly valued, and one can 
see relational motives explicitly identified in their CSR policy initiatives.  Lodge (1990) 
hypothesized that a country’s political ideology shapes the relationship between business and 
government, and further identified Europe as predominantly collectivist in its ideology, while the 
U.S. is more individualistic.  Maignan and Ferrell (2003) extended this analysis to consumers in 
France, Germany, and the US, and found significantly higher concerns for companies´ social 
responsibility in France and Germany than in the U.S.  Thus, governments operating in IGOs in 
Europe can be expected to care about establishing policy frameworks that encourage social 
cohesion between companies, employees, and the communities in which they operate (Roe, 
2000; Goebel, 1993), both as an implication of the political framework in which the governments 
operate, and as a function of representing the interests and views of their citizens.   
Moral Motives.  We suggest that transnational NGOs (but not corporate interest groups) 
are more likely to be driven by altruism, trying to make the world a better place (Egri & Herman, 
2000; Spar & La Mure, 2003), than by instrumental and relational motives, although both 
instrumental and relational motives matter, as just discussed.  Indeed, the public recognizes 
NGOs’ altruistic motivations: polling data indicate that NGOs are trusted more than either 
government or companies to promote the public interest (Zadek, 2001).  Conversely, we see 
corporate interest groups as having a more complex mix of motives.  For example, the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development undoubtedly has business participants who care 
about the underlying social issues, and leaders whose personal values push towards social and 
environmental obligation; yet, they might also be interested in building social capital (Logsdon 
& Wood, 2004). We posit that governments participating in the CSR discourse in the 
transnational public sphere via IGOs also exhibit mixed moral and instrumental motives.  
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Increasingly, they promote universal standards of human rights and ethics, as against arguments 
that local standards should prevail, even when such local standards allow corruption or 
exploitation of the people involved in the productive process (Davies, 2003).  At the same time, 
by inculcating theories of corporate responsibility for the conditions of society and the world, 
governments can deflect some of their own responsibility to adopt global policies and financial 
programs to address issues such as global economic inequality or HIV/AIDS (Cuesta Gonzalez 
& Valor Martinez, 2004).  We suggest: 
Proposition 4a.  NGOs’ needs for power, for alignments/collaborations, and for altruism 
will lead them to push firms to engage in social change through CSR.  
 
Proposition 4b:  IGOs’ interests in promoting competition, social cohesion, and collective 
responsibility will lead them to push firms to engage in social change through CSR.  
 
Interactions between Transnational Motives:  A Multiplicative Relationship 
A final question we wish to address is that of the interactions between these various 
motivations within actors at the transnational level. As the analysis has shown, while all of the 
different actors in the transnational space have a mixture of motivations, the relative priorities 
are different for each.  As an example, we have posited that for NGOs, altruism is generally their 
strongest motivation (moral), followed by either the need to establish collaborations and align 
interests (relational) or the need to gain power to obtain scarce resources (instrumental).  For 
corporate interest groups, that ordering is reversed: instrumental motives are the strongest (the 
drive for power to promote business interests), followed by either relational motives 
(establishing and participating in business networks to enhance effectiveness) or moral motives 
(making the world a better place, consistent with business interests).  Some corporate interest 
groups may lack altruistic motives altogether, and may simply be acting to promote business 
interests (instrumental motives).  
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In addition to recognizing that NGOs versus corporate interest groups have different 
relative priorities among their motives, it is necessary to examine the functional characteristics of 
the type of relationship among motives within these actors.  Here, we suggest that NGOs’ CSR 
motivational function is a multiplicative one, given the exponential power of working in 
networks and collaborations that characterize this level of analysis. For example, as shown in 
Table 2, we would write an exponential equation to conceptually illustrate this value for NGOs. 
In addition to capturing the power of networks and collaborations to multiply the impact 
of NGO’s actions, the multiplicative function, even though conceptual, brings two additional 
points into focus.  First, assuming an entity such as a corporate interest group has no altruistic 
aspect in its motivational structure, its “total CSR motivation” would be zero, since multiplying 
by zero brings any value to zero.  This correctly identifies what such a corporate interest group’s 
contribution to pressuring for CSR in the transnational sphere would be if it had no altruistic 
motivations: none.  Second, if an entity has a negative motivation to be involved in the CSR 
discourse in the transnational space, such as to derail discussion or deliberately undermine 
consensus, the multiplicative function would indicate that there would be a negative pressure for 
CSR resulting from that entity’s actions. 
Proposition 4c. The existence of a multiplicative relationship of motives among 
transnational actors will lead to stronger firm pressure to engage in social change through 
CSR depending on the density and intensity of positive NGO, governmental and 
intergovernmental action. 
 
One question that might be asked is why we understand government’s CSR motivation 
working in a domestic context to be additive and compensatory, while government, as any other 
organization, working in the transnational space is understood to have a multiplicative CSR 
relationship among motivations.  As noted, the multiplicative relationship takes account of the 
power of establishing and communicating through networks, which amplify the power of ideas 
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and may even create the actual or virtual “space” for the creation of new norms.  Governments in 
a domestic context already have access to, and in some cases a monopoly on, a full range of 
power to express and amplify ideas.  Government has full access to the media, and so can easily 
convey its framing of issues and norms; it has access to money; it controls the policy 
development process.  The additive/compensatory framework recognizes that the intensity of 
CSR pressure will depend on government’s total motivation, but that networking in the domestic 
context may not give the government access to any greater power than it already controls. In the 
transnational space, though, government loses its monopoly, and while it still has enviable 
resources, does not enjoy the same privileged communicatory position.  Here, like other entities 
operating in this space, persuasion is key, and collaboration and networking important ways to 
amplify individual government’s views. 
THE INTERPLAY OF MOTIVES ACROSS LEVELS 
Distinguishing actors’ instrumental, relational and moral motivations, and then theorizing 
about their relative priorities and the functional relationships between them, allows us to uncover 
effective mechanisms that encourage firms to engage in CSR efforts and thus contribute to 
positive social change.  We argue that not only do the three types of motives interact in different 
ways within different levels of analysis, but we also posit that different motives interact across 
levels, which may serve to increase or decrease the pressure on organizations to engage in CSR. 
Although examining every possible combination of motives across levels is well beyond the 
scope of this paper, we discuss three examples to illustrate the power and utility of the interplay 
of motives across levels in our model.  
Example 1: Conflicting Motives between Employees and Organizations 
We have suggested that employees will place the most pressure on organizations to 
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engage in CSR when their morality-based motives are especially strong, whereas, at the 
organizational-level, we proposed that CSR pressure would be strongest when instrumental 
needs are high among insiders. This presents a paradox in that an employee with high CSR-
relevant morality needs will seek employment in a firm with corresponding values. However, as 
we have argued, such firms may not be the ones engaging in the strongest CSR efforts. Our 
model would predict that the most social change would occur when “moral” employees work for 
“instrumental” organizations. The fact that employees may not desire to work for such a firm 
might hinder the extent to which this type of employee-initiated social change is possible.  
Example 2: Contradictory yet Complimentary Motives of Management and Consumers 
 Our model shows that the moral concerns of consumers are most relevant in determining 
the amount of pressure they will place on firms to engage in CSR. The model also shows that 
this is the opposite for firm insiders, whose actions are strongly driven by instrumental motives 
for acting socially responsible. This would imply that in countries where there is a great deal of 
consumer demand for socially responsible products, firms would have incentives to produce such 
products.  We have not seen this unfold in practice, however, to as great an extent as would be 
expected, certainly not in all industries where consumers indicate that a company’s CSR profile 
is important in their purchasing decisions (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001).  The question is, why 
aren’t more companies acting to compete on the basis of CSR?   
We propose that one reason behind this phenomenon is that firms’ relational motivations 
within their industry group might at times outweigh their instrumental motivations. Bansal and 
Roth’s (2000) qualitative study of U.K. and Japanese engagement in ecological responsiveness 
shows that a majority of firms in their sample were motivated by what we define as relational 
motives  (e.g. legitimation within a given organizational field and compliance with the law), 
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followed by instrumental motives (e.g. increasing firm competitiveness), and moral motives 
lagging significantly behind.  Kagan et al. (2003)’s qualitative and quantitative study of firms’ 
environmental performance in the U.S., Canada, Australian and New Zealand demonstrated a 
range of attitudes towards environmental performance, but again, relational motives within the 
industry were particularly salient.  We suggest that firms may not have fully tapped these 
markets, although it would be instrumentally intelligent to do so, because they will be 
“persecuted by industry peers” for going beyond the industry’s CSR standards (Bansal & Roth, 
2000), particularly in tightly integrated industries, and particularly where “non-CSR firms” can 
mimic actual CSR by engaging in window-dressing (Weaver et al., 1999), thus diluting the CSR 
first-mover’s competitive advantage. 
Example 3: Amplifying  Motives of Governments, NGOs, and Organizations 
The standards established by laws, while not immediately translated into action in any 
realistic portrait of global organizational practice, have a particularly strong influence on 
establishing social expectations about responsible corporate behavior, and demonstrate a number 
of interactions between actors whose motives we have evaluated and the institutional context in 
which these actors operate.  The social expectations created by law are understood by some 
theorists to create a “focal point” around which firms structure their behavior (McAdams & 
Nadler, 2005).  Once the focal point is created, a number of other forces, including consumer, 
institutional investors, community, and NGO demands, interact to create incentives for firms to 
meet the standards set out in the law (Kagan et al., 2003), whether enforcement is a realistic 
threat or not.  Moreover, the laws and policies that governments enact send a strong signal about 
the importance of a subject—a signal that, with regard to CSR, is amplified by the business 
culture in the country, consumers’ interests, institutional investors’ actions, the corporate 
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governance regime, NGOs’ effectiveness, and the individualistic versus collectivist nature of the 
country’s underlying political and social philosophy.   
The combinations of these factors is exemplified in the administration of Prime Minister 
Tony Blair where the UK became a unique repository of observable CSR culture pressuring 
companies to engage in social change (Aaronson & Reeves, 2002).  The U.K. government 
realized that extractive industry revenue transparency—disclosure of the amount of money 
extractive companies pay to host countries—would help to promote government accountability, 
political stability and reduced poverty in many “resource rich yet poor” countries, and that such 
political stability would be advantageous to two of its flagship companies, BP and Shell 
(Williams, 2004).  The U.K. government also acted from the recognition that if BP and Shell 
alone acted to require host countries to disclose their revenue payments, they would be at a 
disadvantage with respect to Chevron/Texaco or Exxon Mobil, for instance (Olagoke, 2004).  As 
a result, Tony Blair became a leader in the recent Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative to 
encourage all companies in the oil, gas, and mining industry to publish the payments companies 
made to countries to obtain concessions to extract oil, gas or minerals (Danielson, 2004).  In this 
case the instrumental motives of the U.K. government and two major U.K. companies were 
consistent with each other.  Moreover, these instrumental motives were amplified by strong, 
morally based NGO pressures (Global Witness, a U.K. well-respected and established NGO) and 
increasingly engaged U.K. institutional investors who recognized that host-country stability 
would reduce the long-term risks of their extractive industry investments (Williams, 2004). The 
lack of U.S. NGOs pressure for revenue transparency or institutional investors requesting this 
initiative explains why the major U.S. oil companies are much less involved in the Publish What 
You Pay initiative (Williams, 2004), despite its instrumental benefit.  
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 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Our theoretical model illustrates the importance of taking into account multiple actors at 
different levels of analysis to understand social change, as the interactions within and across 
levels can both facilitate and impede CSR.  We contribute to theory by narrowing the micro-
macro divide (as recommended by Klein, Tosi, & Cannella, 1999) and as begun by Logsdon & 
Wood (2004).  In particular, we build up from the employee domain of individual needs and 
transpose this construct to the organizational, national and transnational levels.  In addition, our 
interdisciplinary approach provides the necessary tools to begin to connect the dots within and 
across levels that were previously mostly unconnected within the organizational literature.   
This discussion of CSR as an antecedent of social change shows that the power of the 
relationship among actors is contingent on the environment.  We assume that when CSR 
practices are diffused around the world, there is not so much isomorphism (replication) as 
defined by institutional analysts (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), but rather a modification process, 
referred to as translation, whereby CSR principles and practices imported from elsewhere are 
implemented locally and hence adapted to the different actor’s motives and relationships 
(Campbell, 2004; Djelic & Quack, 2003).   
Limitations  
It is important to point out some limitations of our theoretical model so that future theory 
development and empirical testing can expand on our ideas. First, although our model considers 
many actors, both internal and external to the firm, and at multiple levels of analysis, it is not 
fully comprehensive.  Suppliers are increasingly important, and since their interests vary within 
geographic regions, their varying motives will differentially affect pressures for companies to 
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adopt CSR policies.  In a fully specified theory, unions, particularly transnational labor 
organizations, would also be given separate treatment, evaluating their motivations and actions 
within particular countries and within international organizations, rather than treating them as a 
type of NGO.  Other actors that contribute importantly are private, financial institutions such as 
the World Bank (which has a CSR initiative) and the International Monetary Fund.  Second, as 
recognized above, organizational practices such as CSR are exposed to decoupling effects, such 
that some companies introduce CSR practices at a superficial level for window dressing purposes 
while other companies embed CSR into their core company strategy (Weaver et al., 1999). Our 
model does not differentiate among degrees of CSR seriousness or types of CSR, and this is 
something that future research could refine.  
Another potential limitation of our model is that we have deliberately focused on the 
antecedents of CSR and therefore our discussion of the model has been necessarily “front-
loaded.”  We have given theoretical attention to the beginning of the social change process, i.e., 
how the multiple motives of multiple stakeholders combine to push firms to engage in CSR.  
Future theoretical research should explore the extent to which multiple actors’ pressures affect 
the intensity of CSR efforts, and their consequences.  
Finally, using Dunning’s analytic framework, we have not evaluated the relative efficacy 
of “top-down” influences on firm behavior, such as government regulation, versus “bottom up” 
influences, such as employee, consumer, investor or NGO pressure (Dunning, 2003).  This is an 
important issue to investigate if one views a need to “scale up” CSR efforts to extract the 
maximum benefit for positive social change.  
Future Research 
Future empirical research is now needed to test the many propositions presented here. 
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This research could take the form of micro/employee-level research, which seeks to test the 
linkages between employee perceptions of CSR and outcomes such as participation in CSR 
efforts, as well as commitment to and performance in both CSR and the employees' jobs in 
general. It might also take the form of macro-organizational behavioral research which makes 
cross-organizational and cross-national comparisons of CSR actors and motives and tests how 
these variables differentially predict adoption of CSR initiatives, intensity of adoption, and 
corporate social performance.  
 Future research should give attention to different types of CSR as well as their differential 
effects in fostering social change.  In particular, such research should address the question of 
how pressures placed on firms’ types of CSR might be contradictory.  That is, the firm might be 
pressured to engage in a number of CSR-related activities, but also, at times, the collection of 
activities called for may be internally inconsistent.  For example, promoting underdeveloped 
countries’ agricultural development by donating genetically modified seeds (short-term 
humanitarian aid) might be in contradiction with trying to achieve long-term environmental 
sustainability.  Donaldson and Dunfee (1999: 232) discuss the example of Levis Strauss, when it 
implemented a child labor policy forbidding the employment of any child under the age of 
fourteen, creating a moral conflict since the effect of this policy was to increase poverty in the 
surrounding communities.  Given our framework, the question becomes whether the antecedent 
motives affect how firms resolve such conflicts.   
Lastly, of great value would be true multilevel research, which empirically tests how 
actors’ motives at different levels interact to predict increased CSR and consequently positive 
social change. For example, we think it would be fruitful to conduct a multi-national, multi-
organizational study measuring aspects of organizations' CSR efforts as well as employees’ 
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knowledge of and participation in CSR activities. CSR perceptions, motives, perceptions of 
social exchange relationships, job attitudes, and behavioral outcomes could be measured at the 
employee level, and both firm and social performance could be measured at the organizational 
level. Such a study would allow for a more thorough investigation of the mediating variables 
explaining the social performance-firm performance link found by Orlitzky et al (2003), as well 
as the multiple needs model proposed in the employee-level section.  
We do suggest that future empirical testing of our model use demonstrable corporate 
behaviors as the dependent variable to measure the intensity of CSR engagement, instead of 
using corporate reputation or corporations’ social and environmental reports.  Building on 
Clarkson’s (1995) argument that it is important to identify specific, measurable behaviors when 
studying broad subjects such as a firm’s social responsibility, and Weaver et al.’s (1999) 
observation that firm’s CSR initiatives may range from window dressing to full integration into 
strategic management, we also emphasize the importance of specifying both the range and the 
intensity of CSR initiatives before beginning empirical testing. 
Managerial and Policy Implications 
One important managerial implication from our analysis is that how employees perceive 
the firm, and how these perceptions will influence their commitment to the firm and 
identification with its goals, may be affected by the firm’s CSR initiatives. For example, CSR 
scholars have argued for the importance of employee participation in CSR efforts (Maclagan, 
1999). Further, it has been suggested that employees’ participation in CSR planning, 
coordination, and decision-making can contribute to their personal growth. This is supported by 
recent surveys showing that many companies have successfully incorporated employee 
volunteerism in their larger employee development programs (Edelsten, 1999). Studies also 
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indicate that employees perceive CSR involvement as developmental in nature (Lukka, 2002), as 
well as a catalyst of enthusiasm, commitment, pride, and personal reward (Harris, 2000). Indeed, 
a recent survey of students from top business schools found that 50% said that they would accept 
lower pay to work for a socially responsive firm (Barbian, 2001). Lastly, Starbucks’ low 
employee turnover within the retail food industry is attributed to Starbucks’ socially responsible 
practices. This line of analysis suggests that managers should not view CSR as an external “add-
on,” but rather as an important management tool. 
Another managerial implication is that as firms become increasingly global, CSR 
standards within a firm can play a valuable mediating role in diverse cultures between universal 
ethical principles (those which Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) term “hypernorms”) and local 
norms.  Donaldson and Dunfee describe an arena of “moral free space,” where local norms are 
not in direct conflict with the hypernorms, either because the hypernorms do not address the 
issue or where actions are “incompletely specified” by the hypernorms (Logsdon & Wood, 2002).  
When confronted with a moral quandary in this “moral free space,” such as whether to sell a 
product in a host country that is prohibited for sale in the home country, a well-articulated CSR 
policy can act as a framework for decision-making (Logsdon & Wood, 2004).  This is consistent 
with Fort’s (2001) goals to construct corporations as mediating institutions whose organizational 
architecture, legal and ethical, needs to be carefully considered to promote ethical business 
behavior.  
There are a number of public policy implications to be drawn from our analysis as well.  
We have suggested that the relational motives within an industry might “blind” a firm to the 
motives of consumers, and particularly consumers’ greater willingness to purchase goods from 
socially responsible firms. Recognizing this ordering of motives, we assert that an effective 
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approach to encouraging more firms to engage in serious CSR efforts needs to do one of two 
things: undermine industry cohesion; or pressure the standards of entire industries upward.  The 
former is accomplished when effective NGOs “expand the field” of discourse within an industry, 
and provide an exogenous shock to change the frame of discussion and potentially shift norms of 
acceptable social conduct within an entire industry.  This is precisely what occurred in the food 
industry in the EU (Brooks, 2000; Schurman, 2004). 
The latter route, pressuring the standards of an entire industry upward, can happen in a 
number of ways: self-regulation, as in the Responsible Care Initiative in the chemical industry 
(in response to the Bhopal explosion) (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999); serious consumer 
pressure, as in the food industry in the UK (in response to Mad Cow Disease) (Krebs, 2004); or 
government regulation, which shifts norms and social expectations and allows the harnessing of 
latent consumer and investor pressure (Kagan et al., 2003).  In sum, the tendency for individual 
managers not to improve social and environmental standards until their industry acts 
collectively—because their relational motives within the industry are stronger than their 
instrumental motives to use CSR for competitive advantage in the market—should be understood 
as a market failure, and a rationale for government regulation.8  
The combination of motives across levels pushing a firm to engage in CSR also has 
important implications for government policies to encourage CSR. Governments that use a 
“bully-pulpit,” non-regulatory approach exhort predominantly the commercial benefits of CSR, 
in addition to the social cohesion and collective responsibility arguments they advance.  Yet, 
these government soft policies may not be as effective as classical economic theory would 
suggest they should be due to the importance of industry relationships and firms’ relational 
                                                 
8 Of course there are important exceptions to firms’ unwillingness to break with industry norms, such as BP and 
Shell´s public acknowledgement that petroleum could be linked to global warming and their subsequent pledge to 
reduce “greenhouse gas” emissions (Christmann & Taylor, 2002).   
 48
motivations.  Governments can hardly publicly advance arguments based on industry cohesion 
and tightly-coordinated activities, however, at least not in a theoretically competitive 
marketplace with important anti-trust norms.  Here, industry self-regulation may be more 
effective than government exhortation, so in such instances, governments should work with 
industry self-regulatory groups to improve standards for an entire industry, if the government is 
unwilling to regulate. 
Conclusion  
 There exist many different ways to exert positive social change in society and many 
different agents who have the explicit power to trigger such change. This special topic forum of 
AMR points to corporations as important and necessary social change agents, and this paper has 
identified the many actors that place pressure on corporations to impart social change. We have 
discussed the specific motives driving CSR at four levels of analysis and draw from distinct 
research literatures to develop our model.  We propose this model as a starting point for future 
empirical research in an effort to systematize the analysis of CSR, such that its potential 
contribution to positive social change can be maximized.  
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TABLE 1 
CSR Motives at Multiple Levels of Analysis 
 
  
Level 
 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL 
 
 
Motives 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL  
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
 
 
 
NATIONAL 
 
INTER-
GOVERNMENT
AL ENTITIES 
 
Corporate  
Interest  
Groups 
and 
NGOS 
 
INSTRUMENTAL 
 
 
Need for 
Control 
 
Shareholder interests 
(short-term) 
 
Competitiveness 
 
Competitiveness 
 
Power  
(obtain scared 
resources) 
 
RELATIONAL 
 
 
Need for 
Belongingness 
 
 
Stakeholder interests 
Legitimation/Collective identity 
(long-term) 
 
 
Social Cohesion 
 
Social Cohesion 
 
Interest 
Alignment, 
Collaboration & 
Quasi-regulation 
 
MORAL 
 
 
Need for 
Meaningful 
Existence 
 
 
Stewardship interests 
Higher order values 
 
Collective 
Responsibility 
 
 
Collective 
Responsibility 
 
 
Altruism 
 
 
INTERACTIONS 
 
Upward 
Hierarchical 
 
Insider Downward Hierarchical    
Outsider Upward Hierarchical 
 
 
Compensatory 
 
 
Multiplicative  
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TABLE 2 
The Interplay of Motives within Each Level 
 
 
Level 
 
 
Relationship 
 
Pressure Placed on Firm to Engage in CSR = 
Employee  
 
Upward Hierarchy 
 
= 1 (control) + 2 (belongingness) + 3 (meaningful existence)   
 
Organizational 
Insider Downward Hierarchy 
Outsider Upward Hierarchy  
 
= 3 (shareholder interests) + 2 (stakeholder interests) + 1 (stewardship interests)   
 
= 1 (shareholder interests) + 2 (stakeholder interests) + 3 (stewardship interests)  
National 
 
Compensatory  
 
 
= (competitiveness) + (social cohesion) + (collective responsibility) 
 
Transnational 
 
Multiplicative (a) 
 
 
= (power) x (collaboration) x (altruism)      *ordering depends on actor 
 
Note. Formulas are only conceptual and meant to illustrate the ordering of motives within a level. Weights are only meant to show 
relative ordering, they are not absolute. A higher value indicates more weight is placed on the motive in determining total pressure 
place on the firm to engage in CSR 
(a) The multiplicative metaphor cannot be stretched too far, however, since two negative motivations, perhaps to undermine 
discussions and to disrupt networks, will not create a positive pressure on organizations or IGOs (if that is the arena) to engage in CSR.     
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LEVELS: 
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